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The EU Privacy Directive and the
Resulting Safe Harbor: The Negative
Effects on U.S. Legislation Concerning
Privacy on the Internet
ABSTRACT

The rapid growth of the Internet and the importance of
international business operations have thrust the issue of
Internet privacy into the center of domestic and international
political debates. Varying definitions of privacy have led to
numerous-often inconsistent-legislative schemes to protect
privacy on the Internet. These inconsistencies have made it
difficult for companies to penetrate foreign markets and to
maintain internationaloperations. Of primary concern to U.S.
companies is the EU Privacy Directive. The Directive requires
U.S. companies that attempt to interact with potential
customers or their own employees in the European Union either
to qualify for a "Safe Harbor" or reach an individual
compromise with each country from which data will be
extracted. Not only do these requirementsplace additionalcosts
on U.S. companies, they also place U.S. companies at a
competitive disadvantage. More ominously, it appears that in
the haste of the United States to implement privacy legislation,
legislators are mimicking the EU Directive without considering
the differences between the U.S. and EU legal systems, the
historically different treatment of privacy as a fundamental
right in the European Union, or shortfalls in the Directive itself.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The information superhighway has made geographic boundaries
virtually obsolete.' The free flow of electronic data across borders has
contributed to the growth of the "Information Age" and the global
economy. 2 Internationally, however, governments have begun to
restrict Internet use for various reasons, from political to religious to
economic. 3 The protection of privacy on the Internet is one area in
which the European Union has been a trendsetter. In an attempt to
protect the rights of its citizens, the European Union has passed
comprehensive legislation to protect personal data and privacy 4 on
the Internet. The United States appears to be following the lead of
the European Union. 5
As of yet the United States has no comprehensive privacy
legislation. The current political debates raging in the United States
suggest, however, that it is only a matter of time before Congress will
pass such legislation. 6 One reason for the heated debates at both the
federal and local level is the proactive stance the European Union has
taken. 7
The fact that the EU Privacy Directive8 is far more

1.
A Web of Thought Control, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2001, at N22.
2.
Letter from Susan D. Pinder to David L. Aaron, Undersecretary for
International Trade, Department of Commerce (Apr. 5, 2000), at http:llwww.ita.doc.gov/
td/ecomlComments400fNatBusCoalonEcomComments.htm [hereinafter Letter to Aaron].
3.
See id.; A Web of Thought Control, supra note 1 (detailing government
restrictions on Internet use in countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore).
4.
Throughout this Note, privacy and data collection refer to consumer
information obtained for commercial purposes. Privacy will not be used to refer to the
more narrow issues such as health information, information on children, government
collection of information, or identity theft.
5.
Anna E. Shimanek, Note, Do You Want Milk With Those Cookies?: Complying
With the Safe HarborPrivacy Principles,26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 455, 476 (2001).
6.
Id. at 476-77.
7.
Stefani Geraci, Congressional Hearings Focus on Privacy Issues, 18 PRIVACY
8 (No. 4, 2001).
8.
Council Directive 95146/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) [hereinafter Privacy
Directive].
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restrictive than any measures taken by the United States has
9
dramatically impacted the U.S. approach to privacy regulation. The
Directive prohibits the transfer of information to and from countries
not in compliance, and has therefore caused the United States to
propose regulation to mirror the legislation of the European Union.
Upon first impression, this creates a uniform standard for Internet
operation.' 0 Although a uniform standard may help to create brightline rules, it ignores important differences between the EU and U.S.
legal systems, their respective treatment of privacy, and the cultures
that have developed around the Internet. Furthermore, as this Note
argues, uniform standards may lead to unanticipated increased costs
for global companies and anti-competitive effects for U.S.-based
companies.
In the United States, both sides of the privacy legislation debate
have strong arguments. Prior to the EU Directive, the United States
took a "sectoral" approach to privacy issues, crafting narrow policy
laws that only applied to specific industries or types of information."
Because the European Union was the first to craft a privacy policy,
the United States was forced to act hastily to ensure that U.S.
companies had access to the European market and to their own EUbased subsidiaries or parent companies. During the last six months
of 2000, Internet penetration of households in Europe increased fiftyfive percent. 12 The pressure to ensure that U.S. companies would not
be at a competitive disadvantage in the European market hastened
the development of a U.S. plan to comply with the Directive.
The solution to this need for haste was to create the Safe
Harbor. 13 The perceived need for haste forced the United States to
craft legislation without negotiation or debate. Consequently, the
process failed to take into account the differences between the U.S.
and EU legal systems and their different treatments of privacy
issues. Furthermore, the fear-now justified-was that the Directive
would not only keep U.S. companies from accessing European
consumers, but would also hamper U.S. companies with European
14
U.S.
offices from engaging in trans-Atlantic communications.

Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Margaret G. Stewart, False Alarm?, 51 FED. COMM.
9.
L.J. 811, 814 (1999) (arguing that a multinational corporation "has a strong incentive
to pressure the federal government to bring U.S. law into harmony with that of the
European Union.
Id.
10.
Ron N. Dreben & Johanna L. Werbach, Senators Versus Governors: State
11.
and Federal Regulation of E-Commerce, COMPUTER LAW., June 2000, at 3.
Steve Gold, EU Gives Green Light on E-Commerce Legislation, NEWSBYTES
12.
(Dec. 1, 2000), at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/OO/158859.html.
The text and requirements of the Safe Harbor will be the primary focus of
13.
the remainder of this Note and will be discussed extensively.
U.S. Dept. of Com. Website, Welcome to the Safe Harbor, at
14.
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor.
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legislators and companies were and remain primarily concerned with
avoiding interruptions in business dealings, protecting, U.S.
companies from prosecution in the short term, and protecting the
estimated $125 billion per year in trade between the United States
and the European Union over the long run. 15 U.S. legislators and
companies have failed to negotiate with the European Union to
formulate a means of compliance that will foster the long-term
growth of the Internet.
This Note explores why the Directive and the resulting U.S. Safe
Harbor are likely to prove injurious to the growth of the Internet in
the United States. This Note argues that the Directive and Safe
Harbor will inefficiently regulate a medium that would otherwise
develop effective self-regulatory capabilities. The Note first considers
the differences between the EU and U.S. treatment of privacy. These
differences ultimately require different approaches to regulation.
The history of the Directive and the resulting Safe Harbor is
then traced. The Directive and Safe Harbor prove to have profoundly
affected the treatment of privacy on the Internet in the United States.
Prior to the Directive, the United States relied on self-regulation and
market regulation. These types of regulation take time to develop
and were in the process of perfecting themselves prior to the EU
Directive and the resulting push for government regulation.
Finally, the effects of the Safe Harbor will be considered. Public
choice theories of agenda setting and herding support the argument
that later U.S. regulations will mirror the Directive and Safe Harbor
without considering differences between the United States and
European Union or the different expectations of their respective
citizens. Furthermore, the Directive, Safe Harbor, the activities of
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the resulting legislation
will have negative effects on U.S. companies that have neither
seriously contemplated their treatment of personal data and privacy,
nor are capable of implementing the procedures and processes
necessary to satisfy privacy regulation requirements.

II. INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNET
The Internet is "an appliance of everyday life"'16 and is accessible
worldwide.' 7 The Internet has changed business and economic

15.
Stephen Lawson, Former U.S. Trade Official: Privacy headaches linger IDG
at http://www.computerworld.conr/cwi/story/
SE1v. (Mar. 27,
2001),
NEws
0,1199,NAV47_ST059023,00.html.
at
Read
the
Framework,
White
House
Website,
16.
The
http://whitehouse.gov/WH/New/commerce/read.html [hereinafter White House].
17.
Id.
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paradigms.18 Entrepreneurs and traditional businesses alike see the
Internet as a means to improve business and reach the global market.
Companies operating on the Internet have invested millions of dollars
in an effort to entice customers to use and trust their Internet
services. 19 To capitalize on customer use of the Internet, companies
began collecting personal information on individuals who visited their
websites. 2° Recent advances in technology have made it easier and
cheaper to collect, store, retrieve, and organize consumer
information. 2 1 Companies can use this information to target and
maintain customers, or can organize this information into customer
lists to be sold to third parties. 22 These customer lists have become
valuable resources for companies. 23 This information enables web
advertisements to target potential customers more efficiently than
traditional advertisements. 24 The use of this information, however,
has become the subject of regulation; it remains to be seen whether
Internet companies will be able to capitalize on their investment.
There are generally three methods used to collect information on
the Internet: collection of personally identifiable information, cookies,
and click trails. Personally identifiable information is information
that can be traced back to an individual user, 25 and refers to data like
the user's first and last name, home address, and e-mail address.2 6 A
cookie is a block of text placed on a user's hard drive by a website
when the user visits the website. 27 These files are most commonly
28
placed on hard drives through the use of banner advertisements.
These files track the user's online behavior but do not collect
information such as name, address, or social security number unless

18.

Id.

19.

Henry Welt & Rebecca Wall, Internet Privacy: Consumer Protection,Ecolomics,

or Marketing?, CoMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 17, 2000), at http://www.computerworld.com/
storybal0,4125,NAV47_STO52533,00.html.
20.
Id.

21.

Testimony on Online Privacy Concerns: Before the House Subcomm. on

Comm., Trade, and Consumer Protection, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Paul H.
Rubin, Professor of Law and Economics, Emory University) [hereinafter Rubin].
22.
See id. (applying database technologies and statistical models to consumer
information to form demographic and interest profiles creates consumer profiles
compromising customer lists).
23.
Welt & Wall, supra note 19.
Rubin, supra note 21, (noting that "[a] seller does not ask 'What can I sell
24.
Paul Rubin?' Rather, a seller asks an advertiser such as DoubleClick or 24/7 to 'Put my
ad on 1,000,000 pages viewed on computers of persons more likely than average to
want a new car."').
25.
TRUSTe Website, Privacy Glossary, at http://www.truste.org/partners/
users-glossary.html [hereinafter Privacy Glossary].

26.

Jacqueline Klosek, How the New COPPA Rule Affects Online Data

Collection Practices,N.J. L.J., Nov. 6, 2000.
27.
Privacy Glossary, supra note 25.
28.
Rebecca Lynch, What's All the Fuss About?, CIO MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2000,
availableat http://www.cio.com/archive/100100/fuss.html.
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the user volunteers this personally identifiable information. 29 Only
then can the information gathered by a cookie be linked through
software to personally identifiable offline data.3 0 Cookies notify the
website each time the user returns.3 1 A click trail is a record of all
the websites and pages within a website that a user visits. 3 2 Like
cookies, this information cannot be traced to an individual user,
33
unless the user volunteers personally identifiable information.

III.

PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET

Along with the rapid growth of the Internet have come numerous
legal issues. One of the more controversial and persistently debated
is privacy and the treatment of personal data. This section examines
the treatment of privacy by the United States and the European
Union and how the different treatment of privacy in general leads to
differing views of how to treat privacy on the Internet.
A. United States Treatment
"Americans treasure privacy, linking it to our concept of personal
freedom and well being."34 Interestingly, although Americans may
value their privacy, a right to privacy does not appear in the
Constitution. In addition to this curious anomaly, the issue of
Internet privacy creates special problems when considered within the
traditional paradigms of privacy protection in U.S. law. 35 These
problems are examined below.
Common law affords limited privacy right protections through
invasion of privacy torts, including intrusion on an individual's
seclusion or solitude, public disclosure of private facts, placing an
individual in a false light highly offensive to the reasonable person,
and nonconsensual use of a person's identity for private commercial
36
gain.

29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transaction in
Electronic Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847, 852
(1998).
32.
Privacy Glossary, supra note 25.
33.
Lynch, supra note 28.
34.
White House, supra note 16.
See Owen D. Kurtin & Beth Simone Noveck, Financialcommunity fixes on
35.
online data, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at C12; see generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36.
Marie Clear, Falling Into the Gap: The European Union's Data Protection
Act and Its Impact on U.S. Law and Commerce, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.

L. 981, 992 (2000). The first treatment of privacy as a right came from an article
written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis,
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The Supreme Court has, with difficulty, crafted a workable
definition of the right to privacy that fits within the framework of the
Constitution. The Court interpreted the Bill of Rights, through its
penumbras, 37 to include a personal right of privacy. 38 The Court's
current definition 39of the right to privacy provides for an
"expectations" test.
This right derives from an extension of the
Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizures, 40 and an extension of the Ninth Amendment's "umbrella"
41
protection.
The Court's expectation test considers whether a person claiming
a violation of privacy "has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place." 42 The Court has created a two-pronged test to
analyze alleged constitutional invasions of privacy. 43 The claimant
44
must first have "manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.
The subjective expectation must then be deemed "one that society
'45
accepts as 'objectively reasonable.'
The problem with the expectation analysis in the context of the
Internet is that as soon as a person voluntarily discloses information
to a third party, the "expectation of privacy" disappears, unless the
website assures the user that privacy will be protected. 46 Anytime an
individual provides personal information, either in completing an
online survey or ordering goods online, they have voluntarily
provided personal information and cannot rely on an "expectation of
47
privacy."

The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). William L. Prosser then defined the
See IAN C. BALLON & KEITH M.
right in terms of four causes of action.
KUPFERSCHMIND, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS IN THE
CONDUCT OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 563
n.78 (1999).
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Bill of Rights to include certain
-37.
penumbral rights in Griswold u. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38.
Domingo R. Tan, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of
Internet Data Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 661, 668 (1999).
Clear, supra note 36, at 994.
39.
Id. at 1018 n.72.
40.
41.
See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
U.S. v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 506 (1999) (citing Katz v. U.S., 389
42.
U.S. 347 (1967)).
Clear, supra note 36, at 996.
43.
Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 506 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
44.
35, 39 (1988)).
Id.
45.
Clear, supra note 36, at 995.
46.
Tan, supra note 38, at 670. "What a person knowingly exposes to the
47.
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection." Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52). Individuals who send e-mail
through the Internet, however, do retain an "expectation of privacy." Clear, supra note
36, at 995.
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Several other paradigms of analysis-such as treating Internet
privacy and personal data as an intellectual property right or a
contractual right-have been suggested. These paradigms have
serious flaws as models for privacy regulation.
Some scholars advocate treating personal data as an intellectual
property right.48 Intellectual property law is designed to create
private control over publicly used commercial information. 49 Treating
personal data as an intellectual property right, however, creates First
Amendment problems. 50 Courts have recognized that the level of
protection afforded "commercial speech" should extend to the sale of
personal data to third parties.5 1 The First Amendment protects
commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation but
accords a lower level of protection to commercial speech than to other
Commercial
forms of constitutionally guaranteed expression. 52
speech can be regulated only if the state has a substantial interest in
regulating such speech and the challenged regulation is the least
restrictive means to achieve the substantial state interest. 53 Without
evidence of abuse of personal data, it is uncertain whether the state
would have a substantial interest in protecting personal data.
Furthermore, any regulation adopted by the state will inevitably be
more restrictive than self-regulation and therefore not the least
restrictive means. It is further unclear who deserves the protection,
the consumers from whom the personal data is obtained or the
websites that collect the data. If it is determined that consumers
deserve protection, courts may be reluctant to find an intellectual
54
property right absent a cost effective way to acquire authorization.
It will be difficult to overcome the fact that such transaction costs will
55
likely be very high 'and will arguably not be the least restrictive.
For the websites that do provide users with privacy policies,
56
If
some scholars advocate treating privacy as a contractual right.
gathered information is used inconsistently with the privacy policy, it

48.

Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur,53 VAND.

L. REV. 2041-42 (2000).

Rochell Cooper Dreyfuss, Warren and Brandeis Redux: Finding (More)
49.
Privacy Protection in Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 8, 11.
Id. at 33.
50.
Id. 5 n.4.
51.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
52.
748, 761-62 (1976) (reasoning that "if there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks
all First Amendment protection, therefore, it must be distinguished by its content. Yet
the speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a
commercial subject.").
Id. at 755-56.
53.
Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 36.
54.
Id. (arguing that "it is difficult to think of effective ways for potential users
55.
to negotiate with rights holders").
56.
Kurtin & Noveck, supra note 35.
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would be considered a breach of contract by the website. 57 This
treatment has several problems. In treating privacy as a contractual
agreement between the website and the user, a breach by the website
imposes costs upon the user. 58 To enforce a contractual right, the
user may be required to obtain the services of a lawyer. 59 The harm
suffered by the individual user may not be sufficient for the consumer
to litigate the issue. 60 Furthermore, this analysis only works for
those websites that choose to post privacy policies. If a website does
not post a privacy policy, there is no contractual relationship.
Furthermore, some websites explicitly state that the policy is not a
contract, and consequently a contractual argument will not work with
6
such a website.
B. European Union Treatment
62
In Europe, privacy is considered a "fundamental human right.
The European Union makes data privacy protection the "right of the
individual. '63 Furthermore, in the European Union, the treatment of
personal data is clearly defined in the "mass of acts, directives,
64
amendments, and the like that are currently being developed."
Data protection laws are commonplace in Europe, and many
European countries have had data protection laws in place for the
last two decades, long before any comprehensive action by the
European Union. 65 In many European countries the state takes an
active role in protecting the personal information of its citizens
through legislation. 66 These laws generally address data collection,
storage, use, and disclosure. 67 Commonly, a single piece of legislation
governs both the private and public sectors; other laws addressing
"narrow fields of processing activity" supplement the legislation. 68

57.
See id.
58.
Budnitz, supra note 31, at 876.
Id.
59.
60.
Id. (noting that "[clontracts will provide a right, but no meaningful
remedy").
See, e.g., Privacy Statement, at http://www.weather.com/common/home/
61.
privacy.html. "This statement and the policies outlined here are not intended to and
do not give you any contractual or other legal rights." Id.
Jon Baumgarten et al., Washington Watch, SEC Proposes Automated
62.
Internet Surveillance, 5 CYBER. LAW. 19 (2000).
Patrick Thibodeau, 'Safe Harbor' Deal Doesn't Fully Bridge Data Privacy
63.
Sept.. 13, 2000, at http://www.computerworld.com
Divide, COMPUTERWORLD,
/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV47_ ST050149,00.html.
Clear, supra note 36, at 993.
64.
For example, the German Data Privacy Act required
65.
Id. at 1013.
companies to provide listings of third parties that receive an individual's personal
information. Id. at 1014.
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 12 (1996).
66.
67.
Id. at 13.
68.
Id.
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Prior to the Directive, there was general agreement among EU
Member States as to what constituted fair treatment of personal
data. 69 This agreement focused on four elements: (1) establishment of
obligations and responsibilities for personal information; (2)
maintenance of transparent processing of personal information; (3)
creation of special protection for sensitive data; and (4) establishment
of enforcement rights and effective oversight for the treatment of
personal information.7 0 These elements provided a comprehensive
approach that served as a backdrop for the Directive.71
This
background of agreement permitted the European Union to act more
rapidly to design comprehensive privacy legislation. Arguably, this
also forced the hand of U.S. lawmakers as well.

IV.

EUROPEAN UNION DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE

To understand the EU Data Protection Directive, it is important
to understand the make-up of the European Union. The European
Union consists of a "complex weave" of organizations, including
various associations, commissions, committees, and councils. 72 The
three primary bodies are the European Commission, the European
Council of Ministers, and the European Court of Justice.7 3 The
European Commission recommends policy to the European Council of
Ministers, which enacts policy. 74 Enacted policies preempt any
Member State laws that are inconsistent or interfere with the EU
legislation. 75 If there is an alleged violation of an EU law, the
76
European Court of Justice interprets and applies the law.
The Data Protection Directive was meant both to standardize
rules among participating EU Member States and to strengthen
technology protections. 77 The EU Council of Ministers formally
adopted the Directive on October 24, 1995, and each Member State
had until October 24, 1998 to amend existing state laws to comply
with the Directive.7 8
The Directive was designed to enable
individuals to control the dissemination of their personal
information. 79 "The Directive applies to personal data processed
wholly or partly by automatic systems," and to manual data held in

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Clear, supra note 36, at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 983.
Id.
Tan, supra note 38, at 676.
Clear, supra note 36, at 985.
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filing systems that are organized by reference to individuals. 80
The Directive requires all EU Member States to implement the
following personal data policies: (1) personal data must be processed
fairly and lawfully;8 1 (2) data must be collected and possessed for
specified and legitimate purposes and cannot be used in a manner
inconsistent with those purposes;8 2 (3) data must be adequate,
83
relevant, and not excessive for the purposes for which it is collected;
84
(4) data must be accurate and kept up to date; and (5) data must
not be kept any longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for
which it was collected.8 5
The Directive mandates the following data requirements be
satisfied before information can be processed: (1) the data subject
must have clearly given his or her consent; 86 (2) the processing of the
data must be necessary to complete a contract to which the data
subject is a party or is a necessary step for entering a contract which
the data subject is requesting;8 7 (3) the processing of the data is
necessary to satisfy a legal obligation; 88 (4) the processing is
necessary to protect the vital interests of a data subject;8 9 or (5) the
"[p]rocessing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests
pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the
data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject
which require protection." 90
Article 8 regulates the processing of certain categories of data.91

Dreben & Werbach, supra note 11. Personal data is any information
80.
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. See id., Also, subject to some
exceptions, the Directive forbids the processing of information about racial or ethnic
origin, political affiliation, religious faith, union membership, health status, or sexual
orientation. See id.
81.
Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(a); see also Tan, supra-note 38, at 677.
82.
Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(b); see also John D. Woodward, Jr. & Gary
Roethenbaugh, Fact Sheet on the European Union Privacy Directive, at
http://www.dss.state.ct.us/digital/eupriv.html.
83.
Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(c).
84.
Id. art. 6(d). Every effort must be taken to ensure that data that is
inaccurate is destroyed or erased. Id.
85.
Id. art. 6(e).
86.
Id. art. 7(a).
Id. art. 7(b).
87.
Id. art. 7(c).
88.
89.
Id. art. 7(d).
90.
Id. art. 7(e).
91.
The Directive states, in part:
1.
Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health
or sex life.
2.

Paragraph 1 shall not apply where:
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(a) the data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing
of those data, except where the laws of the Member State provide that the
prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data
subject's giving his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the
obligations and specific rights of the controller in the field of employment
law in so far as it is authorized by national law providing for adequate
safeguards; or
(c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data
subject or of another person where the data subject is physically or
legally incapable of giving his consent; or
(d) processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities
with appropriate guarantees by a foundation, association or any other
non-profit-seeking body with a political, philosophical, religious or tradeunion aim and on condition that the processing relates solely to the
members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in
connection with its purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third
party without the consent of the data subjects; or
(e) the processing relates to data which are manifestly made public
by the data subject or is necessary for the establishment, exercise or
defense of legal claims.
3.
Paragraph 1 shall not apply where processing of the data is
required for the purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the
provision of care or treatment or the management of health-care services, and
where those data are processed by a health professional subject under national
law or rules established by national competent bodies to the obligation of
professional secrecy or by another person also subject to an equivalent
obligation of secrecy.
4.
Subject to the provision of suitable safeguards, Member States
may, for reasons of substantial public interest, lay down exemptions in addition
to those laid down in paragraph 2 either by national law or by decision of the
supervisory authority.
5.
Processing of data relating to offences, criminal convictions or
security measures may be carried out only under the control of official
authority, or if suitable specific safeguards are provided under national law,
subject to derogations which may be granted by the Member State under
national provisions providing suitable specific safeguards. However, a complete
register of criminal convictions may be kept only under the control of official
authority.
Member States may provide that data relating to administrative sanctions or
judgments in civil cases shall also be processed under the control of official
authority.
6.
Derogations from paragraph 1 provided for in paragraphs 4 and
5 shall be notified to the Commission.
7.
Member States shall determine the conditions under which a
national identification number or any other identifier of general application
may be processed.
Id. art. 8.
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Article 10 specifies the information that the data subject is to be
given when personal information is gathered. 92 Article 12 ensures
93
The
that data subjects have a right to access the data collected.
Directive then provides that those gathering data must ensure its
confidentiality and security and provide the necessary procedures to
take if a breach of confidentiality or security occurs. 94 Articles 22
through 24 specify remedies provided to individuals when there is an
infringement of an individual's right to privacy. 95 Articles 25 and 26

92.

The Directive states, in part:

Member States shall provide that the controller or his representative must
provide a data subject from whom data relating to himself are collected with at
least the following information, except where he already has it:
(a)

the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;

(b)

the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended;

any further information such as the recipients or categories of
(c)
recipients of the data, whether replies to the questions are obligatory or
voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of failure to reply, the existence
of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him in so
far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific
circumstances in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair processing in
respect of the data subject.
Id. art. 10.
The Directive states, in part:
93.
Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the
controller:
without constraint at reasonable intervals and without
(a)
excessive delay or expense: confirmation as to whether or not data relating to
him are being processed and information at least as to the purposes of the
processing, the categories of data concerned, and the recipients or categories of
recipients to whom the data are disclosed, communication to him in an
intelligible form of the data undergoing processing and of any available
information as to their source, knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic
processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the automated
decisions referred to in Article 15(1);
as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the
(b)
processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in
particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data;
notification to third parties to whom the data have been
(c)
disclosed of any rectification, erasure or blocking carried out in compliance with
(b), unless this proves impossible or involves a disproportionate effort.
Id. art. 12.
See id. arts. 14-21.
94.
The Directive states, in part:
95.
Article 22 Remedies
Without prejudice to any administrative remedy for which provision may be
made, inter alia before the supervisory authority referred to in Article 28, prior
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are of special significance to U.S. companies, because they prohibit
the transfer of data to countries the European Union does not
consider to be secure. 96 Article 25 allows transfer to non-Member

to referral to the judicial authority, Member States shall provide for the right of
every person to a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed him
by the national law applicable to the processing in question.
Article 23 Liability
Member States shall provide that any person who has suffered damage as
1.
a result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive
compensation from the controller for the damage suffered.
The controller may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, if
2.
he proves that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.
Article 24 Sanctions
The Member States shall adopt suitable measures to ensure the full
implementation of the provisions of this Directive and shall in particular lay
down the sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of the provisions
adopted pursuant to this Directive.
Id. arts. 22-24.
The Directive states, in part:
96.
Article 25 Principles
The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of
1.
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing
after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the
national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive,
the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection.
2.
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall
be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer
operation or set of data transfer operations; particular consideration shall be
given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed
processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final
destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third
country in question and the professional rules and security measures which are
complied with in that country.
3.
The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of cases
where they consider that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of
protection within the meaning of paragraph 2.
Where the Commission finds, under the procedure provided for in Article
4.
31(2), that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, Member States shall take
the measures necessary to prevent any transfer of data of the same type to the
third country in question.
5.
At the appropriate time, the Commission shall enter into negotiations
with a view to remedying the situation resulting from the finding made
pursuant to paragraph 4.
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The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred to
6.
in Article 31(2), that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, by reason of its domestic law
or of the international commitments it has entered into, particularly upon
conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5, for the protection of
the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of individuals.
Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply with the
Commission's decision.
Article 26 Derogations
By way of derogation from Article 25 and save where otherwise provided
1.
by domestic law governing particular cases, Member States shall provide that a
transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country which does not
ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25(2) may
take place on condition that:
the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the
(a)
proposed transfer; or
the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract
(b)
between the data subject and the controller or the implementation of
precontractual measures taken in response to the data subject's request; or
the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a
(c)
contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller
and a third party; or
the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public
(d)
interest grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims;
or
the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of
(e)
the data subject; or
the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or
(0
regulations is intended to provide information to the public and which is open
to consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can
demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent that the conditions laid down in
law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case.
Without prejudice to paragraph 1, a Member State may authorize a
2.
transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country which does not
ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25(2),
where the controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the
protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals
and as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights; such safeguards may in
particular result from appropriate contractual clauses.
3.
The Member State shall inform the Commission and the other Member
States of the authorizations it grants pursuant to paragraph 2. If a Member
State or the Commission objects on justified grounds involving the protection of
the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, the
Commission shall take appropriate measures in accordance with the procedure
laid down in Article 31(2). Member States shall take the necessary measures to
comply with the Commission's decision.
Where the Commission decides, in accordance with the procedure
4.
referred to in Article 31(2), that certain standard contractual clauses offer
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States only if that country ensures an "adequate level of protection." 97
The definition of "adequate" is flexible and looks to the laws in force
in the non-member country. 98
In addition to the Directive, the European Union has launched
the eEurope Initiative on Brussels Regulation, which outlines
procedures for cross-border disputes. 99 The initiative provides that
European consumers may sue non-EU businesses in their own
national courts. 100

V. THE SAFE HARBOR
On November 1, 2000 the Safe Harbor agreement went into
effect in response to the Data Protection Directive. 0 1 Designed to
ensure a means of compliance for U.S. companies, the Safe Harbor
was the culmination of two years of intense negotiation between the
10 2
European Union and the Unites States.
From the time of its passage, U.S. companies were concerned
with the possible ramifications of the Privacy Directive, particularly
with Article 25 of the Directive. 10 3 Until they could guarantee an
adequate level of protection to European citizens, U.S. companies
could not receive credit card information or other types of data,
10 4
including employee information, from European Union citizens.
Historically, the United States has taken a different approach
from the European Union to provide privacy protection. 10 5 As noted
in Part III.A, the United States used a combination of legislation,
regulation, and self-regulation to regulate privacy. Keeping within

sufficient safeguards as required by paragraph 2, Member States shall take the
necessary measures to comply with the Commission's decision.
Id. arts. 25-26.
97.
PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD
DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 32

(1998).

98.

See id.

99.
Gold, supra note 12.
100.
Id.
101.
Electronic Privacy Information Center, EPICAlert, vol. 7.20, § 6 (Nov. 14,
2000), at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPICAlert_7.20.html [hereinafter EPICAlert 7.20].
102.
Id.; FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSEN, Data Protection v.
Privacy: United States and EU Come to Terms on a Safe Harbor,21st Century Money,

Banking & Commerce Alert No. 2000-04-20 (Apr. 20, 2000), reprinted in 5 CYBER L. 14
(2000).
103.
Julie M. Fromholz, Berkeley Technology Journal Annual Review of Law
and Technology, Foreign & International Law, The European Union Data Privacy
Directive, 15 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 461, 469 (2000).
104.
Clear, supra note 36, at 988-89.
105.

See generally U.S. DEPT. OF COM., SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES

(2000), at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor [hereinafter SAFE HARBOR].
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this framework, the U.S. Department of Commerce crafted the Safe
Harbor agreement to provide a level of protection to Europeans
sufficient to permit U.S. companies to transfer data between
individuals within EU Member States and the United States.10 6 This
requires that the U.S. privacy policy must be deemed adequate upon
consideration of "all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer
operation" 10 7 and the legislative provisions, both general and sectoral,
in force.' 0 8 In crafting such a standard, the Safe Harbor was
designed to provide adequate protection, while maintaining a certain
amount of flexibility to prevent the Safe Harbor from being overly
09
cumbersome or costly.'
Under the Safe Harbor, a company receiving personal data from
the European Union must abide by the following seven criteria:
112
security, 113 data integrity, 114
notice, 110 choice,"' onward transfer,

106.
Id.
107.
Deborah M. McTigue, MarginalizingIndividual Privacy on the Internet, 5
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 5, 40 (1999) (quoting Ian Lloyd, An Outline of the European
Data Protection Directive, J. INFO.
L. & TECH., Jan. 31,
1996, at
http://www.elj.warwick.ac.uklelj/jilt/dp/intros/default.htm).
108.
Id.
109.
See id. 41. Those companies that cannot comply with the Safe Harbor
may do business in those EU Member States with which the company has entered a
special contract permitting the export of personal data from that country to the
company's country. Lawson, supra note 12. These contracts must generally be
negotiated country by country and may take as long as two months to reach an
agreement. Id.
110.
NOTICE: An organization must inform individuals about the purposes for
which it collects and uses information about them, how to contact the
organization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third parties to
which it discloses the information, and the choices and means the organization
offers individuals for limiting its use and disclosure. This notice must be
provided in clear and conspicuous language when individuals are first asked to
provide personal information to the organization or as soon thereafter as is
practicable, but in any event before the organization uses such information for
a purpose other than that for which it was originally collected or processed by
the transferring organization or discloses it for the first time to a third party.
SAFE HARBOR, supra note 102.
111.
CHOICE: An organization must offer individuals the opportunity to choose (opt
out) whether their personal information is (a) to be disclosed to a third party or
(b) to be used for a purpose that is incompatible with the purpose(s) for which it
was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the individual.
Individuals must be provided with clear and conspicuous, readily available, and
affordable mechanisms to exercise choice.
For sensitive information (i.e., personal information specifying medical or
health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership or information specifying the sex
life of the individual), they must be given affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice
if the information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other
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These criteria are based largely upon

than those for which it was originally collected or subsequently authorized by
the individual through the exercise of opt in choice.
In any case, an
organization should treat as sensitive any information received from a third
party where the third party treats and identifies it as sensitive.
Id.
112.
ONWARD TRANSFER: To disclose information to a third party, organizations
must apply the Notice and Choice Principles. Where an organization wishes to
transfer information to a third party that is acting as an agent, as described in
the endnote, it may do so if it first either ascertains that the third party
subscribes to the Principles or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy
finding or enters into a written agreement with such third party requiring that
the third party provide at least the same of privacy protection as is required by
the relevant Principles. If the organization complies with these requirements,
it shall not be held responsible (unless the organization agrees otherwise) when
a third party to which it transfers such information processes it in a way
contrary to any restrictions or representations, unless the organization knew or
should have know the third party would process it in such a contrary way and
the organization has not taken reasonable steps to prevent or stop such
processing.
Id.
113.
SECURITY: Organizations creating, maintaining, using or disseminating
personal information must take reasonable precautions to protect it from loss,
misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.
Id.
114.
DATA INTEGRITY: Consistent with the Principles, personal information must
be relevant for the purposes for which it is to be used. An organization may not
process personal information in a way that is incompatible with the purposes
for which it has been collected or subsequently authorized by the individual.
To the extent necessary for those purposes, an organization should take
reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable for its intended use, accurate,
complete, and current.
Id.
115.
ACCESS: Individuals must have access to personal information about them
that an organization holds and be able to correct, amend, or delete that
information where it is inaccurate, except where the burden or expense of
providing access would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual's
privacy in the case in question, or where the rights of persons other than the
individual would be violated.
Id.
116.
ENFORCEMENT: Effective privacy protection must include mechanisms for
assuring compliance with the Principles, recourse for individuals to whom the
data relate affected by non-compliance with the Principles, and consequences
for the organization when the Principles are not followed. At a minimum, such
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the Fair Information Practices principles developed by the FTC over
1 17
the past three decades.
Adherence to the Safe Harbor agreement is completely
voluntary 1 8 and compliance can be achieved in a number of ways. 19
First, a company may implement all the restrictions of the Safe
Harbor, notify the Department of Commerce that the company
intends to comply with the Safe Harbor, and publicly declare
compliance on its website. 12 0 A second route to compliance requires a
company to develop its own self-regulatory policies, notify the
121
Department of Commerce, and publicly declare its compliance.
This method of compliance may be achieved through complying with
of Commerce of
a safety seal program that notifies the Department1 22
the company's participation and ensures compliance.
The U.S. Department of Commerce maintains the official list of
U.S. companies that have agreed to abide by the Safe Harbor
agreement.' 2 3 If a website were to state that it complied with the
Safe Harbor and then act contrary to the stated policy, the FTC has
the power to challenge the practice. 124 This authority derives from
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits

mechanisms must include: (a) readily available and affordable independent
recourse mechanisms by which each individual's complaints and disputes are
investigated and resolved by references to the Principles and damages awarded
where the applicable law or private sector initiatives so provide; (b) follow up
procedures for verifying that the attestations and assertions businesses make
about their privacy practices are true and that privacy practices have been
implemented as presented; and (c) obligations to remedy problems arising out
of failure to comply with the Principles by organizations announcing their
adherence to them and consequences for such organizations. Sanctions must
be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by organizations.
Id.
Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record: Hearing on S. 809
117.
Online Privacy ProtectionAct of 1999, S. 2606 Consumer Privacy ProtectionAct of 2000,
and S. 2928 Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act of 2000: Before the Senate
Com. Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director,
Electronic Privacy Information Center) (explaining how Fair Information Practices
resulted from the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 which placed requirements on
http://www.epic.orgl
at
agencies),
reporting
credit
privacy/internet/testimony_1000.html [hereinafter Rotenberg Testimony].
118.
SAFE HARBOR, supra note 105.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.; see also FRIED, FRANK ET AL., supra note 102.
See FRIED, FRANK ET AL., supra note 102.
121.
122.
TRUSTe Unveils European Safe Harbor Privacy Seal Program: World's
Largest Privacy CertificationProgramMakes Landmark Move to Provide Global Online
at
Nov.
1,
2000,
NEWSWIRE,
Dispute Resolution, PR
and
Offline
http://www.truste.org/about/about_eu.html [hereinafter Privacy Seal Program].
123.
EPICAlert 7.20, supra note 101.
Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John Mogg, Director, European Commission
124.
2 (July 14, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter to Mogg].
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"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in or affecting commerce.125
The FTC Act authorizes the FTC to obtain injunctive relief against
future violations and to compensate injured consumers. 126 The FTC
can seek redress for both U.S. and foreign citizens. 127 Anyone who
does not comply with an injunctive order is subject to a civil penalty
of up to eleven thousand dollars, with each day of violation
128
constituting a separate violation.
Currently the authority of the FTC is somewhat limited. 129 The
FTC can only prosecute companies that misrepresent their purpose
for collecting information. This provides companies with a loophole,
because if they do not provide a privacy policy there is no
misrepresentation. 130 Furthermore, the ability of the FTC to regulate
in this area only covers unfair or deceptive practices if they are "in or
affecting commerce," 13 1 so information being traded 132without
commercial purposes remains outside the power of the FTC.
The FTC pursues law enforcement actions through active
investigation and monitoring, and also through referrals received
l 33
from regulatory agencies such as TRUSTe and BBBOnline.
TRUSTe, the Internet's leading privacy seal program, has launched
an EU Safe Harbor Privacy Program. 13 4 By joining the TRUSTe
program, U.S. companies fulfill the Safe Harbor requirements to self135
certify to the Department of Commerce that they have complied.
U.S. companies can choose either to create their own program to
criteria of
satisfy the Safe Harbor or can choose to satisfy the
13 6
TRUSTe. BBBOnline acts in the same way as TRUSTe.

125.
Id. A deceptive practice is a representation, omission, or practice that is
likely to mislead reasonable consumers in a material fashion. A practice is unfair if it
causes, or is likely to cause, substantial injury to consumers that is not reasonably
avoidable and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2001).
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
128.
U.S. DEPT. OF COM., SAFE HARBOR ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW: FEDERAL AND
STATE "UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES" AUTHORITY AND PRIVACY (July 14, 2000), at

http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/enforcementoverviewfinal.htm.
129.
See Letter to Mogg, supra note 124, at 6.
130.
See id.
131.
Id. at 7.
See id.
132.
Id. at 2.
133.
Privacy Seal Program, supra note 122.
134.
135.
Id.
136.
BBB3ONLINE, Inc., at http://www.bbbonline.com (businesses can apply for
reliability and privacy seals).
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VI. EFFECTS OF THE SAFE HARBOR

The Safe Harbor was entered into to protect the interests of U.S.
companies in transactions with EU Member States. This section
analyzes whether that short-term goal was met and considers other
unanticipated effects of the Safe Harbor.
A. Effects on U.S. Privacy Policy
While the Safe Harbor has permitted trans-Atlantic transactions
between the United States and the European Union to continue, the
Safe Harbor has also dramatically impacted the privacy policy debate
in the United States. This section analyzes how the Safe Harbor
legislation has had both herding and agenda setting effects on the
U.S. privacy policy debate.
1. Herding
Herding is a culture-based theory. 137 The theory suggests that
actors may rationally decide to follow the actions of others because
they assume that previous actors had more information when they
made their decision. Therefore, copying the previous decision is
perceived to be the most efficient way to act. 138 Applying this
the
reasoning to privacy, U.S. privacy law is likely to be similar to
139
Safe Harbor because the Safe Harbor is all that presently exists.
There is evidence of this in Senate bill S. 2928, the "Consumer
Internet Privacy Enhancement Act,"'140 House bill H.R. 89, the "Online

Eric Talley, PrecedentialCascades:An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 90137.
92 (1999).
138.
Id. See also Charles Sipos, Note, Gun Control from Public to Private, 55
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2002).
Congress has taken a small step towards privacy legislation in its passage
139.
of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA"), which only protects the
privacy of children under the age of 13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2001). COPPA requires:
(1) posting prominent links providing how they collect, use, and disclose information
collected about children; (2) notifying parents they wish to collect information and
obtaining parental consent; (3) not limiting a child's participation on a website to the
provision of information more than is reasonably necessary; (4) allowing parents to
view children's information, have it deleted, and prohibit future collection; and (5)
establishing procedures to protect the information collected from children. Id.; see also
Orrin S. Shifrin & Lisa K. Liou, COPPA: A Practical Guide to Compliance with the
Children's Online Privacy ProtectionAct, 5 CYBER L. 11 (2000). Although this preceded
the Safe Harbor, it garnered its support from the fact that it protected children, not in
its broad attempt to regulate privacy, as does the Safe Harbor.
Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act, S. 2928, 106th Cong. (2000).
140.
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Privacy Protection Act of 2001,'141 and Senate bill S. 2606, the
"Consumer Privacy Protection Act."'142 The language within the
proposed legislation reflects the objectives of the Safe Harbor and the
EU Directive. 143 For instance, the "Consumer Internet Privacy
Enhancement Act" makes it unlawful for a commercial website
operator to collect personally identifiable information unless certain
conditions are satisfied. 144 The website must provide the user with
notice that includes: identification of the website operator, a list of
the type of information that might be collected, how the information
will be used, a list of possible recipients of the information, the steps
being taken to protect the security of the information, and the steps
145
users may take to stop use of their information by the website.
These requirements reflect the influence of the Safe Harbor and the
FTC's Fair Information Practice principles.
Section 2(d) of the Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement
Act-entitled "Safe Harbor"-is indicative of the influence the Safe
Harbor has had on subsequent legislation. 146 The Section provides
that a commercial website operator does not violate the Act if it
complies with the self-regulatory guidelines of seal programs or
As
representatives of the marketing or online industries. 147
explained in Part V, the seal programs have adopted the regulatory
schemes necessary to ensure compliance with the Safe Harbor to
satisfy the Directive. 148 If a company satisfies the Safe Harbor, it
automatically complies with the Act. The Act has therefore done
little more than adopt the Directive's Safe Harbor as its own.
The herding effect can also be seen in the role the FTC plays in
protecting Internet privacy. Prior to the EU Directive, the FTC
advocated Internet self-regulation. 149 The Safe Harbor provided the
FTC with an opportunity to increase its governing role and, perhaps
as a result, the FTC appears to have changed its position towards
Apparently, the FTC concluded that
Internet self-regulation.

141.
Online Privacy Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2001).
142.
Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S. 2606, 106th Cong. (2000).
Id.
143.
144.
S. 2928 106th Cong. §2(a), (2000). It is irrelevant for the purposes of this
Note which bill, or version of any of the above bills, is actually passed. What is
important for the purposes of this Note is that all three bills reflect the influences of
the Directive and the Safe Harbor.
145.
Id. § 2(b)(1)(A)-(G).
See id. § 2(d).
146.
147.

Id.

148.
See httpJl/www.truste.comlprograms/pub-harbor.html; http://www.bbbonline.com/
privacy/eu.asp.
149.
Hearing on Privacy in the Commercial World: Before the House Subcomm.
on Com., Trade, and Consumer Protection and the House Commn. on Energy and Com.,
107th Cong. (2001) (testimony and statement for the record of Marc Rotenberg,
Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center) [hereinafter Second
Rotenberg Testimony].
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regulation was necessary because it realized that if the Safe Harbor
were mimicked in legislation, the FTC would be incorporated into any
new legislation, 150 because of its reliance on Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which declares "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce" to be illegal. 151 Furthermore, the
Safe Harbor incorporates the FTC's Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPPs) and these FIPPs can be seen in resulting
legislation. 152 For instance, the "Online Privacy Protection Act of
2001" requires the FTC to prescribe regulations to protect consumer
153
privacy on the Internet.
Due in part to the attention given to the issue of Internet privacy
protection, it is now politically popular to advocate protecting
privacy. 154 Legislators have warned, "if the private sector won't
ensure consumers their privacy is protected on-line, then the federal
government will step in and try."'155 The Directive and the resulting
Safe Harbor give legislators the ability to make their threats a
reality, and quickly. 156 They already have statutory language which
they can "cut and paste" without much debate and without thoughtful
consideration.
Events such as the bankruptcy of the web-based company
Toysmart exacerbate the herding effect and encourage Congress to
After filing for bankruptcy,
enact "cut and paste" legislation.
Toysmart sought to sell its consumer information list in violation of
its own privacy policy. 15 7 The FTC reached a settlement with

150.
See id. (noting that it was not until the year 2000 that the FTC concluded
that regulation was required).

151.

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2001).

Rotenberg Testimony, supra note 117 (stating that these FIPPs
152.
incorporated the responsibilities of the organization that collect personal information
and the of those individuals that provide information).
H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2001). There is a public choice argument that the
153.
FTC has acted to create a role for itself in regulating privacy on the Internet. Steven
Hetcher, The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms, (Sept. 5, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).

David McGuire, Net Privacy Law Could Pass, Despite Congressional
154.
Rancor, NEWSBYTES, Dec. 5, 2000 (quoting Andrew Shen, policy analyst for the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, who stated that "privacy as an issue is much
more bipartisan..."), at 2000 WL 27303518.
Tan, supra note 35, at 675.
155.
This
156.
Other countries have begun implementing privacy policies.
strengthens the argument of U.S. legislators who support a privacy policy when they
allege that the United States provides inadequate privacy protection relative to other
countries. For instance, on January 1, 2001 the Canadian Personal Information
Electronic Privacy
Protection and Electronic Documents Act became effective.
at
Center, EPIC Alert, vol. 8.01, § 4 (Jan. 17, 2001),
Information
[hereinafter EPIC Alert 8.01]. The
http:lwww.epic.org/alert/EPICAlert_8.01.html.
Canadian law establishes Fair Information Practice for personal data collected by
private sector organizations. Id. The Act is enforced by the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada. Id.
Id.
157.
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Toysmart, which eventually led to the sale of the list to Walt
Disney-a majority owner of Toysmart-conditioned on a promise
that Disney would keep the list confidential. 158 Nevertheless, the
incident provides an example of the threat of abuse from which the
Directive protects European consumers. It also provides an example
of what U.S. consumers may expect companies to do upon
bankruptcy, if personal data is not protected. 159
2. Agenda Setting
Agenda setting is a public choice theory that states that the
order in which alternative proposals are considered will influence the
solution that is actually adopted. 160 Prior to the Safe Harbor, there
were arguments for and against Internet privacy protection that fell
everywhere along the political spectrum. Some urged absolutely no
protection for personal data; others believed personal data should be
The Safe Harbor essentially
treated as intellectual property.
determined how these preferences would be presented before
Congress and the public. 16 1 After the Safe Harbor, any proposal that
offers less protection to consumers than that offered by the Safe
Harbor is likely to be dismissed. Yet, prior to the Safe Harbor, the
leading argument was for self-regulation of Internet privacy. 16 2 The
Safe Harbor essentially destroyed the self-regulation argument, and
the "agenda" for policy legislation is currently based on various
combinations of Safe Harbor and FTC language, which can be
employed by the government to draft privacy protection legislation. 163
The enactment of the Safe Harbor enabled those advocating
legislative action for privacy protection to ask the politically powerful
question, "Why are Europeans getting better privacy protection than
Americans are?"'164 Because Europeans are already being protected
under the Safe Harbor and the Directive, any legislation that
provides less protection to Americans will be unacceptable. Due to

Id.
158.
159.
Id.
160.
See generally Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and
Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1977) (discussing two ways in which
agenda influences outcomes).
161.
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 427 (1988).
DMA Testifies on Privacy and Self-Regulation, 62 DIRECT MARKETING ASS'N
162.
8 (Sept. 1, 1999).
163.
James Evans, High-Tech Trade Group Unveils Net Privacy Principles, IDG
NEWS

SERVICE,

(Jan.

18,

2001),

at

http://www.idg.net/ec?go=l&content

source

_id=13&linkid=400563 (noting that high-tech trade organizations which once lobbied
for Internet self-regulation are now lobbying for federal legislation so as to avoid
conflicting privacy rule from the 50 state governments).
Keith Perine, Not Enough Privacy?, INDUS. STANDARD, July 10, 2000
164.
(quoting privacy advocate Jason Catlett).
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the Safe Harbor, those who once advocated self-regulation have been
forced to change their position and use their resources to attempt
legislation beneficial to the various organized industries operating on
the Internet. 16 5 The Safe Harbor has, in essence, served as a
substantial victory for those advocating regulation and has changed
the focus of the debate. 166 Even-though there is objective evidence
that self-regulation was working, the change in focus has made such
evidence moot. 167 The Safe Harbor has set a minimum standard by
which all future privacy legislation is judged.
In practice, the Safe Harbor creates a positional conflict for U.S.
companies opposed to such regulation. 168 To access the European
market, companies must sign up for the Safe Harbor and, at the same
time, try to argue that the laws are too cumbersome to implement in
the United States. 169 Furthermore, those companies that do not sign
up for the Safe Harbor and do not provide a policy are beyond the
scope of FTC power. Under the Safe Harbor, the FTC possesses only
limited power and cannot require that entities collecting information
on the Internet adhere to a privacy policy. 170 This discrepancy has
171
led the FTC to call for comprehensive privacy legislation.
The debate now occurs between those who want strict privacy
legislation, much like the EU Directive, and those who advocate
achieving a balance between the interests of consumers and the
"legitimate interest of business in operating efficiently and in using
information to improve the quality, variety and cost-effectiveness of
products and services. ''172 With the Directive and the Safe Harbor

165.
The AeA, the nation's largest high-tech trade association, released
principles in an attempt to guide legislators in drafting privacy legislation. Marc
Brailor, AeA Unveils Federal Privacy Principles; Says Balanced Approach, Uniform
Standards, Can Build Consumer Confidence, Boost Internet Growth, at
http://www.aeanet.org/pressroom/pret-privacyprinciplesOll8Ol.asp.
The principles
were released in response to the attempts of state governments to regulate online
privacy and to help legislators identify the technical and economic realities of the
Internet. Id.
166.
Businesses appear to have realized that some form of regulation is
inevitable and have shifted lobbying efforts to promoting uniform regulation as
opposed to a patchwork quilt of state regulation. Edmund Sanders, Politicians,
Industry Gear Up for Public Battle Over Privacy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2001, at C1. Two
dozen states in 2000 tried to strengthen their privacy laws, but businesses were able to
lobby successfully on the local level to prevent such legislation. See id.
167.
See Rubin, supra note 21 (arguing that the ability of consumers to quit
engaging with websites that may abuse consumer information is a powerful incentive
for websites to respect the privacy rights of consumers, and evidence shows that when
a company does something that is seen as harming its reputation with consumers, the
company suffers a substantial loss in value).

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Letter to Mogg, supra note 124, at 6.
Id.
Letter to Aaron, supra note 2.
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available, those advocating more restrictive regulations have an
agenda setting advantage. For instance, Senate bill S. 2928, the
"Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act," requires every
website to satisfy four basic standards: notice, choice, access, and
security. 173 There are a number of bills with variations on these
174
principles, reflecting the influence of the Safe Harbor and the FTC.
There is likely to be little protest as the bill is currently drawing
bipartisan support. 175 Instead, the debate will focus on the variations
in the level of protection.
The Safe Harbor, rather than selfregulation, will act as a minimum standard.
B. Anti-Competitive Effects
Although the Safe Harbor enables U.S. companies to continue to
engage in trans-Atlantic transactions with the European Union, in
the long-run the Safe Harbor may have a negative impact on U.S.
companies. This section examines the European market, the timing
of the Safe Harbor, and the costs imposed by the Safe Harbor and
speculates that, over the long-run, the Safe Harbor will do U.S.
companies more harm than good.
1. European Market
U.S. companies feared that the Privacy Directive would prohibit
them from accessing the European online market, 176 projected to be
worth $1.2 trillion by 2004.177 Judging by the number of U.S.
companies that have availed themselves of the Safe Harbor, the
European market is extremely attractive to U.S. companies and is
one to which they want to assure themselves access. 178 The Safe
Harbor has created a "non-tariff trade barrier in that a U.S. person
cannot do business with the European Union unless that U.S. person
agrees to play by EU rules. '179 However, as discussed below, there is

173.
See, e.g., John F. Kerry & Carly Fiorina, Congress Should Act to Boost
Online Privacy, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 2000, available at http://kerry.senate.gov/
'kerry/globe-net.html; Press Release, McCain, Kerry, Abraham, Boxer Unveil Internet
Privacy Bill, (July 26, 2000), at http://www.senate.gov/-mccain/webprivate.htm.
174.
Sanders, supra note 166 (discussing how both Democratic and Republican
lawmakers are offering privacy bills).
175.
Id.
176.
Baumgarten et al., supra note 62.
177.
Douglas F. Gray, Euro Internet Economy Worth $1.2 Trillion by 2004, A
New
Study
Predicts, IDG
NEWS
SERVICE
(Oct.
26,
2000),
at
http://www.idg.net/ec?go=1&content-source-id=13&linkid=347875.
Germany and the
United Kingdom will account for over fifty percent of European online revenue in 2004.
Id.
178.
Tamara Loomis, Data Privacy: A Few Companies Have Complied with EU
Law, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 2001, at 5.
179.
Letter to Aaron, supra note 2.
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evidence that the European Union is not enforcing the Directive.
U.S. companies therefore face much greater costs to adhere to the
Safe Harbor because they face potential litigation 'nd sanctions from
the FTC. 180
The Directive achieves several victories for European companies.
First, it keeps out a number of U.S. competitors. Second, it increases
the costs for those U.S. companies that do try to penetrate the
European market. Furthermore, the Directive has costly implications
for companies with global operations, because companies must be
careful of what data is collected and transferred from EU employees
to computers located in the United States, as well as how that
information is used. This permits the European Union to favor EU
companies to the detriment of U.S. companies.
2. Timing
Internet commerce is new-no model of excellence exists and
many companies are still trying to figure out how to become
profitable.' 8 '
Although many European companies may have
considered the issue of privacy immediately, U.S. online companies
were not prepared to comply with the Privacy Directive. 8 2 Even
after the Europeans implemented the Privacy Directive, U.S.
companies resisted any form of regulation and 'most made little
progress in changing their privacy policies to qualify for the Safe
Harbor. 183 U.S. companies may be eager to sign up for the Safe
Harbor without considering whether they are technologically or
legally prepared. For example, two companies whose websites carried
the TRUSTe privacy seal and claimed to adhere to the TRUSTe
criteria were selling personal information to a marketing company in
184
violation of the privacy seal policies.
In the two years between the enactment of th6 Directive and the
adoption of the Safe Harbor, European companies had a competitive
advantage over their U.S. counterparts and could build brand name
recognition within the European Union. A well-known brand name

180.
Joris Evers, U.S. Beats Europe in Online Privacy Protection, INFOWORLD
(Jan. 24, 2001), at http://www.infoworld.com/articles/hni/xml/01/01/24/010124hnprivsur.xml.
Lynch, supra note 28.
181.
182.
Baumgarten et al., supra note 62.
183.

Kevin Featherly, U.S. Cos. Don't Make 'Safe Harbor' Privacy Grade,

NEWSBYTES (Aug. 16, 2001), at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/169115.html.
"American companies doing business overseas electronically have generally failed to
implement minimum data privacy protections for their customers .. " Id.
184.
Rebecca Lynch, Analysis, E-Privacy Debates Faces Long Road Ahead, CIO
(Oct. 4, 2000), available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/10/04/
privacy.fuss.idg/index.html.
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undoubtedly helps bring traffic to websites. 185 In order to build brand
name recognition on the Internet, consumers must be made aware of
a website and the services offered. U.S. companies hoping to carry
over brand name recognition from the traditional marketplace to the
Internet may not be able to do so as easily in Europe, where they lack
pre-existing name recognition. These companies often hope to target
186
potential customers by e-mail with promotions for their website.
The Directive, however, prohibits U.S. companies from accessing
information on European consumers, and those companies who have
not signed up for the Safe Harbor cannot contact Europeans,
1 87
regardless of whether or not they intend to collect personal data.
This creates an obstacle to developing brand name recognition among
Europeans. The Directive hurts U.S. companies because the websites
that develop brand name recognition are the ones that do well.1 88
In some niches of the Internet it is important to capitalize on the
first mover advantage.' 8 9 The online-auction business is one such
example. 190 eBay was the first to develop brand name recognition in
this industry, and while others like Yahoo! and Amazon have tried to
compete, eBay has continued to grow and dominate in the onlineauction industry due in large part to its first mover advantage and
the large mass of users it obtained before its competitors. 191 U.S.
companies have lost this advantage in the European market to
European companies, who were able to act in the two years between
the enactment of the Directive and the creation of the Safe Harbor.
Those U.S. companies that are unable to comply with the Safe Harbor
are at a disadvantage relative not only to their European competitors,
but also to their U.S. counterparts that can comply.
An additional timing problem applies to both the Safe Harbor
and any resulting U.S. legislation. "Change is the normal state of

185.
MARC BRAUNSTEIN & EDWARD H. LEVINE, DEEP BRANDING ON THE
INTERNET: APPLYING HEAT AND PRESSURE ONLINE TO ENSURE A LASTING BRAND 26

(2000).
186. Id. at 117 (the most successful marketing tool on the Internet is e-mail).
187.
SAFE HARBOR, supra note 105.
188. Interview by Jack Cafferty with Micheal Exstein, Retail Analyst, Credit
Suisse First Boston, Before Hours (CNNFN television broadcast, Apr. 6, 2000); see also
FTD.COM FiscalFourth Quarterand Year 2000 Results Showcase Strong Gains in Key
Operating Metrics, BUS. WIRE, Aug. 8, 2000 (noting that "[t]he primary driving force
behind our growth is the 96% awareness of the FTD brand name among consumers.
This brand name recognition continues to fuel our growth as Internet shoppers are
increasingly migrating to strong brands with proven distribution capabilities.").
189. Adam Cohen, eBays Bid to Conquer All: For All the Dotcoin Disasters,
Here's One Company That's Redefining E-Commerce, TIME, Feb. 5, 2001, at 48. "The
lore among Internet strategists was that whoever nabbed Web space early would have
a commanding commercial ...lead." Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. "Attempts by other companies to replicate eBay have bombed. eBay
controls more than 80% of the online-auction market, with Yahoo and Amazon lagging
far behind." Id.
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affairs for the Internet."'192 Regulation is a "cumbersome, inflexible
tool" and regulation could "freeze some aspects of the Internet in their
current state." 193 Unlike the Internet, which changes and adapts
easily, a poorly constructed regulatory scheme will be very difficult to
change once in place, due to the U.S. political structure. 194 The
United States should not lock itself into a regulatory scheme without
ensuring that it will be equipped to support the growth of the
Internet. This issue is not of such grave concern for the European
Union because directives, unlike regulations, "'are binding as to the
result to be achieved' . . . [but] the choice of the method is left to the
state concerned."' 195 This provides EU Member States much. more
flexibility in accounting for the growth of the Internet than does U.S.
legislation.
3. Increased Costs to Companies
Trying to adopt privacy policies after years of operating without
them is proving to be an expensive endeavor for many U.S.
companies.
To comply with the Safe Harbor or similar U.S.
legislation, some U.S. companies' costs for privacy policies may
increase from zero to the full cost of compliance. 196 It remains
unclear what the actual costs of compliance with the Safe Harbor will
be, as there exists no serious study of the cost or "technological
19 7
feasibility" of implementing the Safe Harbor.
Some of the costs of compliance are foreseeable-and quite
considerable. Some websites will have to invest time and money to
create privacy policies to satisfy notice requirements, while others
will have to adapt their pre-existing privacy policy to satisfy the Safe
Harbor. 198
Arguably, requiring websites to post privacy policies is
unnecessary.1 99 Consumers who are concerned about privacy can
choose to avoid sites that do not post their privacy policies. Websites
that choose not to post policies will "choose" to lose these

192.
193.
194.

Rubin, supra note 21.
Id.
Id.

195.

D.

LAsOK & J.W.

BRIDGE,

LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY 137 (5th ed. 1991).
196.
SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 97, at 43.
197.
Letter to Aaron, supra note 2.
198.
Letter from Charles A. Prescott, Vice President, International Business
Development and Government Affairs, Direct Marketing Ass'n to Ambassador David L.
Aaron, Undersecretary for International Trade, Department of Commerce (Apr. 4,
2000), at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/Comments400[DMAComments.htm.
199.
NCC's Privacy Group Cautions Against Hasty Pledges That May Harm
Consumers, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 12, 2001 [hereinafter NCC's Privacy Group
Cautions].
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customers. 200 Requiring privacy "legalese" forces all websites to pass
costs on to the consumers, and may have the effect of forcing some
20 1
smaller businesses out of the market.
Likewise, there are costs associated with compliance with the
access component of the Safe Harbor. Providing a system where
individuals can access the information gathered about them is
expensive and cumbersome. 202
Increasing the ease with which
consumers can access their own personal data leads to greater
security risks, which in turn leads to increased costs for preventing
security breaches. 20 3 Furthermore, compliance with the Safe Harbor
requires hiring new employees to ensure information gathered is
relevant and to address any concerns raised by individuals.
For smaller online companies, or those experiencing financial
20 4
difficulties, the privacy requirements may be insurmountable.
Most costs associated with privacy protection are fixed. Therefore it
is more difficult for such costs to be borne by a small company,
because the costs do not depend on the size of the company. 20 5 A
small children's site, Zeek.com, estimated that it would cost
approximately $200,000
a year to comply with privacy
requirements.2 0 6 Such costs will deter small companies from setting
up Internet commerce operations, depriving the market of new startup companies that have historically served as a source of valuable
2 07
innovation and growth.
The Safe Harbor also creates enormous inefficiencies for global
companies. If the human resource department of a global company
wants to maintain records for all of its employees, it must be careful
with the data it collects from EU employees and ensure that the data

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Panelists Say Privacy Solutions Ignore First Amendment, COMM. DAILY,

Oct. 26, 2000.

Some argue that the security of personal information should be the

larger issue, as opposed to the mere fact that information is collected. Id. Tools
designed to make personal information more secure are susceptible to fraud and could
lead to "social hacking." Id.
204.
Jennifer Jones, Financial Institutions' Grapple With New Privacy
Regulations, INFOWORLD.COM (Oct. 27, 2000), at http://www.infoworld.com/articles/hnI

xmlIOO/1O/30/OOlO3Ohnprivacy.xml.

Although the article dealt with compliance with

the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the same problems will be faced with the Safe Harbor.
205.
Rubin, supra note 21. "All of these costs are 'fixed' costs, and so are higher
per unit of output for small than for large firms. Thus, any such regulations would
serve at least in part as a barrier to entry against small firms, and as a source of
protection for large established firms." Id.

206.

Linda Rosencrance, Complying With Privacy Law Too Pricey for Kid Site,

COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 18, 2000), at http://www.computerworld.com/storyba/
0,4125,NAV47_ST050556,00.html. Although Zeek.com was dealing with the costs of
complying with the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, the costs and
requirements of the Safety Harbor are equivalent. Id.

207.

Rubin, supra note 21.

20021

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE SAFE HARBOR

is used only for approved purposes.2 0 8 This also impacts the use of
In designing such services,
company-wide Intranet services.
companies must either restrict access to U.S. domestic employees or
take the expensive measures necessary to ensure compliance with the
Safe Harbor.
Currently the Safe Harbor only controls transactions with
individuals within the European Union, but proposed legislation
indicates that the protections Europeans receive will soon be
extended to U.S. citizens. 20 9 For those companies adhering to the
Safe Harbor in their treatment of Europeans, applying this treatment
to U.S. citizens will increase costs because there will be more
information for which to account. Furthermore, there is a value in
collecting, analyzing, and using the data of consumers. The Safe
Harbor and the resulting legislation will severely limit the use of
such data.
The Safe Harbor and resulting legislation take away another
competitive tool of Internet companies: Internet companies could
otherwise distinguish themselves from their competitors according to
the level of the privacy protection they provide.
U.S. privacy
legislation will have the effect of "leveling the playing field." A recent
Forrester Research survey found that forty-one percent of Internet
shoppers read the privacy policies of websites they visited for the first
time. 210 The more satisfied they are with a site's privacy policy, the
more likely they are to stay and shop. 2 11 Furthermore, a user could
choose to maintain complete anonymity on a site, but in return may
be unable to access some portions of the site. 212 This method would
213
allow users to determine the value of their personal information.
The Forrester Research survey found that trust develops when people
2 14
can control their information and receive a benefit for sharing it.

208. Stephen Lawson, Former U.S. Trade Official: Privacy Headaches Will
Linger, IDG NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 27, 2001), at http://www.idg.net/crd idgsearch
_0.html?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Ecomputerworld%2Ecom%2Fcwi%2Fstory%2F0
%2C1199%2CNAV47_ST059023%2C00%2Ehtml&sc=.
"[Mlultinational companies
that centralize their human-resources operations in the U.S. may have to grapple with
what information can and can't be carried across borders and stored." Id.
209. Patrick Thibodeau, 'Safe Harbor'Deal Takes Effect, But Adoption May Be
Slow, COMPUTERWORLD
(Nov.
1, 2000), at http://www.computerworld.com/
storyba/0,4125,NAV47_ST053171,00.html. "Americans are going to ask why they are
second-class citizens in their own country." Id.
210. Pamela
Blackstone, Making Privacy a
Policy, PUBLISH,
at
http://www.publish.com/features/0012/featurel3.html.
211.
Id.
212.
Id.
213.
Consumers willing to exchange their personal data online are often able to
find better discounts. Karen Talaski, E-tailers discover coupons; Online shoppers make
more purchases, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 10, 2000, at Bi. Other customers are willing to
exchange data for the chance to wins thousands, even millions, of dollars. Fred 0.
Williams, Area Man Wins Cybercash, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 28, 2000, at Cli.
214.
Blackstone, supra note 210.
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Those websites-that take extra steps to protect privacy earned this
trust. Consumer desires prompt websites to take action Without
government coercion. Websites are motivated to avoid developing a
reputation for not respecting consumer privacy rights. 2 15 The impact
of these negative effects should be enough to motivate websites, and
until it can be shown to be inadequate, government should not
216
interfere.
4. Increased Costs to Consumers
Privacy legislation may also increase costs for consumers who
use the Internet. Currently, revenue generated from advertisement
space on websites helps to fund the websites.2 17
These
advertisements, or banner ads, permit the placement of cookies to
record online behavior. 218 Advertisers use this information under the
credo "past behavior determines the future. 219 While consumers
may not approve, it makes advertising more effective and consumer
"web surfing" more efficient and cheaper. A self-regulatory scheme
permits interaction between websites and consumer so that a balance
can be struck between the amount of information a consumer reveals
and the power of companies to effectively use the information.
Proposed legislation may lead to fewer online services and reduced
website content, because it will hinder the effectiveness of
advertising, thus decreasing the incentive to advertise on the
Internet. 220 This will hurt the same consumers that the legislation is
2 21
intended to benefit.
The Safe Harbor and proposed legislation fail to take into
account variations among consumer preferences for privacy
protection. 222 Consumers have shown a willingness to enroll in
Internet surfing programs that monitor all browsing. 223 The Internet
and privacy technology currently offer all levels of privacy

215.
Rubin, supra note 21.
216.
Id.
217.
Id. (noting that "advertising revenue supports many valuable services that
are provided to consumers at no charge.... The amount of free information available
on the Internet is truly remarkable, and this information is paid for through
advertising.").
218.
Lynch, supra note 28.
219.
Id.
220.
Brailor, supra note 165.
221.
Id. (arguing that the Internet should remain open and "allow consumers to
enjoy the full benefits of the new economy's innovations").
222.
Rubin, supra note 21. An AT&T Internet privacy survey found that
roughly one quarter of Americans are "intensely" concerned about privacy and another
quarter have little or no concern. Id.
223.
Id. (noting that "AllAdvantage.com pays consumers to monitor their
browsing").
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protection. 22 4 This is different from the privacy environment of the
EU Privacy Directive, where privacy is considered a fundamental
right. 225 The level of preference for privacy protection is much more
easily identifiable in such an environment. Europeans may be less
willing than their U.S. counterparts to have their entire web
browsing activities monitored. The Safe Harbor did not take this into
account because it was concerned only with the interactions of U.S.
companies with Europeans. U.S. legislation, however, should take
this difference into account. Otherwise, those consumers who are
willing to share their information in exchange for benefits will lose
2 26
this option.
Use of consumer data leads to efficiencies for consumers.
22 7
Consumers receive information that is tailored to their interests.
This targeting prevents consumers from being bombarded by
advertisements of no interest to them. 228
Both consumers and
advertisers thus "have an interest in better targeting of advertising
'229
messages.
Privacy legislation may adversely affect consumers in another
way. It is possible that disclosing the volume of information required
by the Safe Harbor will overwhelm Internet users. 230 Consumers
may find it inconvenient to be forced to read notices of privacy policies
before using a website.2 31 "Opting-in," which is advocated by some, is
one such example of inconvenient notices. Opting-in requires each
2 32
site to obtain user permission before collecting personal data.
Those consumers that do read the notices may find them
incomprehensible, even if efforts are made to ensure they are "clear
233
and conspicuous."
The more efficient method is "opting out," which requires users
23 4
to proactively refuse to have their personal information collected.
Opting-out allows consumers who are concerned about their privacy
to take easy steps to protect themselves, while those consumers who
are not worried and want to benefit from the collection of their

224.
Id.
225.
See supra,European Union Treatment, Part III.B.
226.
See Rubin, supra note 21. "Privacy regulations could .have the effect of
making some business plans infeasible and thereby depriving consumers of goods and
services that are now available." Id.
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
229.
Id.
230.
Rotenberg Testimony, supra note 117.
231.
See id.
232.
Mark Rockwell, ISPs Opt In and Out-Selling personal consumer
information is a lucrative trade coming to a possible end, TELE.cOM, Dec. 11, 2000, at
37.
233.
Rotenberg Testimony, supra note 117.
234.
Privacy Glossary, supra note 25.

354

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35.321

information can choose to do so without cumbersome procedures. 23 5
"Opting-in" places the burden on the concerned consumer, rather
than the company and other consumers who are not concerned with
the collection of their data.
5. Costs to the Market of Developing Businesses
Internet privacy legislation may sound a death knell for a
developing industry. Regulation may destroy the need for privacy
seals such as those provided by TRUSTe and BBBOnline, because the
criteria and services these companies provide will be legislatively
required. While TRUSTe has-at least temporarily-preserved a
need for its services by partnering with the Department of
Commerce, 23 6 this solution may be short-lived. If Congress passes
legislation similar to the Safe Harbor, there will be little or no reason
for companies to obtain a TRUSTe or BBBOnline privacy seal. If
companies must, by law, comply with privacy regulations to operate
on the Internet, there is no need for a privacy seal to assure
customers that a website is respecting their privacy rights. The fear
of legal action for failure to comply should be sufficient to warrant
adherence to posted privacy policies.
Another business that may be lost is currently developing
technology to enable users to control the amount of data they
reveal. 23 7 The technology is still relatively new and therefore has not
had enough time to demonstrate its effectiveness. 238 This technology
would allegedly improve a company's ability to compile data about
consumers while attaching consumer preferences for gathering and
sharing information. 23 9 Such technology enables websites to respect
consumer privacy preferences without continuously bombarding

235.
Brailor, supra note 165 (arguing that "[c]onsumers should be allowed to
receive benefits and services from vendors in exchange for the use of information. It is
important that the consumer understands this use and be able to make an informed
choice to provide information in return for the benefit received.").
236.
Privacy Seal Program, supra note 122. BBBOnline is also trying to secure
a position for itself within a regulatory framework. BBBOnline has formed a
partnership with the Japan Information Processing Development Center to develop
recognizable privacy seals for Japan and the United States. White House Annual
Electronic Commerce Report Praises BBBOnline for Promoting Online Consumer
Protection, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 19, 2001.
237.
For example, iPrivacy allows shoppers to use a password to check into a
trusted site. Leslie Brooks Suzukamo, To Some, It's a Cookie; To Others, A Monster,
NEWS AND OBSERVER, Jan. 22, 2001, at D6. From there shoppers go shopping on the
web, but when the websites look at the shopper it sees the iPrivacy computer server,
not the consumer's. Id. Another example is PersonaValet 3.0, which enables users to
block and monitor unwanted cookies. Id. It lists the website that sent the cookie and
allows the user to determine whether to destroy or keep the cookie. Id.
238.
Id.
239.
Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Internet FirmsAct to Ease Sharingof Personal Data,
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2000, at El.
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240
consumers with notice and consent requests.
Another technology designed to help solve this issue was
developed by the World Wide Web Consortium, and is called a
"Platform for Privacy Preferences" (P3). P3 is based on the principles
of notice, control, and choice. 241 This enables consumers to set their
242
computer so it operates at a preferred level of privacy protection.
When a consumer attempts to visit a site which requests more
information than the consumer is willing to disclose, the site can
refuse to let the consumer enter, ask the consumer to make an
allow the consumer to
exception, or waive its information request and243
use the website without collecting information.
If the collection of data were regulated, then there would be no
need for such technologies. The market was in the process of crafting
its own answer to the privacy dilemma. These technology-based
solutions would have benefited both consumers and companies.
Companies could still gather useful information and concerned
244
consumers could choose to incur the costs to protect their privacy.
Also, concerned consumers utilizing privacy-protecting technology
could choose to disclose information when they believed it was secure
245
and beneficial for them to do so.

6. Liability
As of yet, there has been no evidence that European authorities
will enforce their data privacy laws against companies based in
Europe. 246 U.S. companies are concerned that there may be a double
standard. 24 7 U.S. companies should resist the Safe Harbor if they
perceive that U.S. companies are being treated unfairly. 248 Upon
implementation of the Directive, Privacy International, a leading
240.
Id.
Budnitz, supra note 31, at 884. Other technology has also developed.
241.
Andrea M. Singh, Internet Privacy, In Any Language, Is Beneficial, NEWSDAY, Apr. 30,
2001, at C7. The Ponoi Corporation enables users to surf the Internet through the
company website at http://www.ponio.com. Id. The technology prevents third parties
from accessing personal data such as the identity of the user and Ponio does not have
access to the personal data of its users. Id. The technology is portable, as it is within a
browser as opposed to a desktop application. Id.
242.
Bunditz, supra note 31, at 884.
243.
Id.
Rubin, supra note 21; see also NCC's Privacy Group Cautions, supra note
244.
199.
Steven Hetcher, Climbing the Walls of Your Electronic Cage, 98 MIcH. L.
245.
REV. 1916, 1934 (2000).
Thibodeau, supra note 209. There is an argument that the current U.S.
246.
policy of self-regulation in fact provides U.S. Internet users more privacy protection
than the EU privacy protection laws, which are seldom enforced. PanelistsSay Privacy
Solutions Ignore FirstAmendment, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 26, 2000.
247.
Thibodeau, supra note 209.
248. Id.
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advocacy organization, began to investigate the practices of twentyfive multinational companies to determine whether their information
practices violated the Directive. 249
Some of the companies
investigated were Ford, Hilton International, Marriott International,
and Microsoft. 250 There was no evidence that purely European
companies were also being investigated on such a completely random
25 1
basis.
Regardless of whether U.S. privacy legislation is passed, if a U.S.
company violates the Directive, its liability may be greater than its
European counterparts for a suit brought by a European. The ability
of a European to win a judgment against a U.S. company depends on
two possible factors: the willingness of U.S. courts to apply European
law to decide liability in a case brought against a U.S. company, and
the willingness of U.S. courts to enforce a European judgment against
assets located in the United States. 252 There may be more of an
incentive to bring suit in a U.S. court because, unlike many European
countries, the loser of litigation does not have to pay the legal
expenses of the winner. 253 Also, damages are generally larger in the
United States.
An even greater problem arises if the United States passes
legislation that enables U.S. citizens to sue U.S. companies. Due to
differences in the legal system between the European Union and
United States, U.S. companies are subject to much larger
judgments.2 54 If U.S. legislation is passed, U.S. companies that fail to
adhere to the Safe Harbor or U.S. legislation are at risk of much
greater liability then their European counterparts.
"Certain
procedural factors, like jury trials and contingent fees, are absent in
Europe, as are some of the economic incentives to sue, due to a more
pervasive welfare system in Europe which offers adequate
redress. '255 Also, the Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act
permits civil actions by states on behalf of individuals. The risk of
256
civil liability is not an issue in Europe.
Evidence suggests that European companies are actively

249.
Woodward & Roethenbaugh, supra note 82.
250.
Id.
251.
Id.
252.
Perritt & Stewart, supra note 9, at 817.
253.
Id.
254.
There is also the question of whether the inverse could be asked. Would
Europeans with websites reaching U.S. customers be subject to greater damages in
litigation then European websites that do not reach U.S. customers? Would this
discourage European companies from trying to penetrate the U.S. market?
255. Joachim Zekoll, Kant and ComparativeLaw-Some Reflections on a Reform
Effort, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2719, 2731-32 (1996).
256. In Europe, the loser of a civil liability claim must pay the court costs and
attorney fees of the winner. This affects the selection of suits for litigation. Eric
Talley, Symposium on Fee Shifting, Liability Based Fee Shifting Rules and
Mechanisms Under Incomplete Information, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461 (1995).
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collecting consumer data, even with the extensive regulations
provided by the Directive. 25 7
Consumer World, a worldwide
federation of 263 consumer organizations, conducted a study in which
the privacy policies of popular U.S. and European sites were
analyzed. 258
Among European sites, only nine percent asked
permission to sell the information provided by the customer and only
twenty percent asked permission before adding the customer to an email distribution list. 259 Among U.S. sites, half asked for consent to
sell customer information.2 60 What is most striking about these
figures is that the European websites analyzed were operating under
a comprehensive set of privacy rules, while U.S. websites analyzed
were operating in a relatively unregulated environment.
This
suggests that European regulations are not being enforced against
European companies.

VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of privacy on the Internet is relatively new to the
United States and should not be addressed hastily. Despite the
strides that were being made under a self-regulatory approach,
comprehensive legislation now appears inevitable. In creating such
legislation, however, there must be careful consideration of both the
current and future state of the Internet. The EU Directive and
resulting Safe Harbor should not be followed blindly without
considering the enormous differences in the historical treatment of
privacy in the European Union, the legal structure of the European
Union, and the geographically borderless features of the Internet and
the global economy. These characteristics require U.S. legislators to
thoroughly analyze privacy legislation options.
To carefully craft legislation, legislators should not begin with
the Safe Harbor as a minimum standard for privacy legislation. The
Safe Harbor should be recognized for what it is-a hasty attempt to
assure compliance with the EU Directive. Legislation must consider
the unique characteristics of the Internet in the United States,
including the Internet's history of self-regulation and the speed at
which the Internet grows and changes. Issues such as notice and
consent should not take precedence over free speech and economic
concerns. Legislators must keep in mind what the true issues are
and not merely hurdle over them by beginning with the Safe Harbor
as a basis for any newly proposed legislation. Time must be taken to
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259.
260.

Evers, supra note 180.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ensure that legislation is well coordinated to protect consumers while
fostering the growth of the Internet and ensuring that the costs of
legislation do not exceed the benefits.
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